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I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970's, Jacksonville, Florida's fire and police officials
customarily invited journalists to accompany them as they searched a
private home for evidence of arson shortly after a fire. A Florida
* Associate Professor; College of Journalism and Mass Communication, Univer-
sity of Georgia; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1977; B.A., Michigan State University,
1966. The author would like to thank David Anderson, Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Texas, and Tonda Rush, Associate General Counsel, American Newspaper
Publishers Association, for helpful comments on an early draft of this article.
Times-Union photographer, named Cranford, played a quasi-official
role as he accompanied officials in the search of Klenna Ann
Fletcher's home. When officials ran out of film, they asked Cranford
to take a picture of a spot on a bedroom floor where Ms. Fletcher's
17-year-old daughter, Cindy, had fallen after being overcome by the
fire. Cranford's picture of the "silhouette" became part of the official
record and was published in the Times-Union. Ms. Fletcher, who
was out of town at the time of the fire, learned of her daughter's
death by reading the Times-Union' and thereafter sued the newspa-
per for trespass in Florida Publishing Co. v. fletcher.
In Fletcher, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a journalist has
an implied consent, based on custom and usage, to enter private prop-
erty after a calamity if invited by officials. The consent recognized by
the court was not implied by Ms. Fletcher, the owner of the house,
who objected to the journalist's entry into her home. Rather, the
court recognized a privilege created by law despite a homeowner's
objections.
The privilege to trespass may be recognized in law where the prac-
tice is customary and serves a public interest outweighing the harm
caused.2 The Florida Supreme Court said it is common for journal-
ists to accompany officials onto private property "where a disaster of
great public interest has occurred," providing the entry is peaceful, at
the invitation of investigating officers, and without damage to the
property. 3 The court relied on affidavits from media and law en-
forcement agencies testifying to the prevalence of journalists accom-
panying officials, and also noted the lack of litigation in this area as
evidencing the recognition and acceptance of the practice by the com-
munity. The social benefits of the practice include the reporting of
important newsworthy events and the aid given by journalists to offi-
cials conducting searches.
It is indeed common for journalists to accompany officials into pri-
vate homes, not only on searches of fire scenes as in Fletcher, but also
on raids and emergency entries with paramedics, police, and other of-
ficials. Geraldo Rivera is perhaps the best known practitioner of this
sidekick journalism,4 but many other journalists routinely accom-
1. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
2. See infra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
3. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918. Ms. Fletcher also sued for invasion of privacy and
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from publication of the photo-
graph. A Florida circuit court judge dismissed the privacy count and granted final
summary judgment in favor of the Times-Union on the counts alleging trespass and
emotional distress. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's
grant of summary judgment on the trespass count. Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co.,
319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The Supreme Court of Florida held that Ms.
Fletcher could not recover for trespass. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918.
4. See Filming of Police Raids is Examined, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 24, 1987,
[Vol. 16: 259, 1989] Journalists, Trespass, and Officials
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
pany officials into private places. One California television producer
said he entered private residences with authorities "ten to fifteen
times" to acquire film footage for a single documentary on
paramedics in Los Angeles. 5
As suggested by Dave Zweifel, editor of The Capital Times in
Madison, Wisconsin, it might seem reasonable that journalists be able
to enter private property if invited by an official. After all, Zweifel
said, "They are public officials."6 However, what is commonly prac-
ticed is not necessarily legally privileged. Since Fletcher, other courts
have not accepted the Florida Supreme Court's recognition of an im-
plied consent to trespass based on custom and usage when journalists
enter private dwellings with officials. 7 Nor have courts recognized a
first amendment privilege for journalists to accompany officials onto
at 47; Keller, Participatory Journalism and the Courts, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, June 27,
1987, at 20; Live on the Vice Beat, TIME, Dec. 22, 1986, at 60; Woman Sues Over TV
Arrest, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1986, at D16, col. 1; Roth, Reactions Run Hot and Cold to
Rivera's Goofups and Glory, Variety, Dec. 24, 1986, at 74, col. 1.
5. See Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1475, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673 (1986)
(testimony of television producer Ruben Norte).
6. Jury Verdict Seen as Warning to News Media, The Capital Times (Madison,
Wis.), Nov. 28, 1986, at 23, col. 1.
7. The same year that Fletcher was decided, the Florida District Court of Appeal
refused to review a lower court ruling denying summary judgment for journalists
charged with malicious trespass for accompanying police on a midnight raid of a pri-
vate school. See Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 327 So. 2d
810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). For a discussion of Green Valley, see text accompanying
notes 180-183 infra.
In 1980, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, reversing a lower court dismissal, ruled
that a jury should decide whether a broadcast journalist trespassed when he accompa-
nied officials on a raid. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App.
1980) (no implied consent from custom and usage). Brosamle rode with Lt. Kuenning
in a squad car onto the property of a rural research corporation belonging to biochem-
ist Helmut Prahl. Id. at 135-36, 295 N.W.2d at 772. Brosamle filmed part of a police
interview with Dr. Prahl in his home. Id. at 136, 295 N.W.2d at 773. Prahl claimed he
did not protest because he thought Brosamle was a police employee. Id.; see also Prahl
v. Brosamle, No. 82-1753, slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1983) (no implied consent if
reasonable belief owner would object).
In 1981, the New York Supreme Court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, dis-
missing affirmative defenses for trespass in a case where upstate television journalists
accompanied a humane society official on an administrative search of a private home.
Anderson v. WROC-TV, 7 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1987 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981). The New
York court called the custom and usage doctrine relied upon by the Florida Supreme
Court a "self-created custom and practice," and a "bootstrap argument which does not
eliminate the trespassory conduct of the defendants in this case." Id. at 1989. In An-
derson, employees of three stations accompanied Ronald Storm of the Humane Society
of Rochester on an investigation of abuse of animals. Id. at 1988. Storm, operating
with a search warrant, investigated a complaint that animals were being mistreated at
the home of Joy E. Brenon. Id. Unlike the plaintiffs in either the Fletcher or Prahl
private property.S Instead, courts have held that journalists accompa-
nying officials may be liable not only for trespass, but also for any
resulting invasion of privacy and emotional stress.9 Also lurking in
these decisions is the possibility that journalists may be liable for
civil rights violations when they participate with officials in particu-
larly intrusive raids.1O
Courts rejecting the custom and usage privildge of Fletcher do not
offer a detailed legal analysis for their decisions. Instead, they tend
to rely on the truism that first amendment and common law protec-
tions on newsgathering do not include protections for tortious con-
duct. Undeveloped in these cases, however, are the severe limits
imposed by common and constitutional law on the powers of officials
to invite journalists-or anyone else-onto private property.
This article argues that neither the affidavits nor lack of litigation
relied upon by the Fletcher court support the conclusion that the
practice of journalists accompanying officials into private homes is
sufficiently common to constitute a legal privilege absent house-
holder consent. Furthermore, the newsgathering values served by
such journalists are not sufficient to justify the violation of a home-
owner's property and privacy interests protected by the law of tres-
pass. In support of these propositions, the discussion will initially
review why consent for journalists to enter homes with officials can-
not be implied, and then argue that a privilege created by law under
the doctrine of custom and usage is not justified. Finally, the article
addresses journalists' liability, real and potential, for trespass, intru-
sion, and civil rights violations.
cases, Brenon objected when the television crew entered her house to shoot footage
which was later broadcast.
On appeal, the appellate division for the fourth department ruled that the humane
society investigator, acting under a search warrant, was not a co-trespasser with jour-
nalists where the official told press photographers he had no authority to permit them
to enter. Anderson v. WHEC-TV, 92 A.D.2d 747, 748, 461 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983). But see Wood v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1610
(Iowa Dist. Ct. 1986) (journalists' entry onto farmland with permission of officials to
photograph dead cattle neither an invasion of privacy nor a trespass). Unlike the jour-
nalist in Fletcher, the journalists in Wood did not enter a house, but entered adjoining
land.
8. See, e.g., Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1492-93, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 685
(1986); Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Ct. App. 1980).
9. See Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986). A Wisconsin jury
granted nominal damages to a Ripon, Wisconsin, mother and her four children for vio-
lation of constitutional and privacy rights when police invited a weekly newspaper re-
porter to cover a raid on their home. The Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 28, 1986,
at 23, col. 1. A jury also awarded a couple $25,000 for trespass and invasion of privacy
after a Madison TV reporter accompanied sheriff's department deputies on an early
morning raid. Rogers & Callender, Jurors Award Couple $25,000 in Privacy Lawsuit,
The Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Jan. 10, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
10. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text.
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II. CONSENT
Journalists and other private citizens may enter private property
either with consent of the possessor or with a privilege. According to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, consent "indicates that the posses-
sor is in fact willing that the other shall enter or remain on the land,
or that his conduct is such as to give the other reason to believe that
he is willing that he shall enter. . .""' Possession is claimed by the
person who occupies land with intent to control it.12 Usually, the
possessor is the owner, but possession may be yielded by lease or con-
tract to a tenant,13 or granted to a friend, relative, security guard, or
other agent.14
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 comment c (1965).
12. Id. § 157. "The action for trespass is designed to protect the interest in exclu-
sive possession of the land in its intact physical condition." W. PROSSER & P. KEETON
ON TORTS 77 (5th ed. 1984). Therefore, it is the person who possesses land who can
give or deny consent for others to enter the property. The burden of establishing the
possessor's consent rests with the person who relies on it. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 167 comment c (1965).
A possessor of land is defined as:
(a) a person who is in occupation of the land with intent to control it, or
(b) a person who has been in occupation of land with intent to control it, if
no other person has subsequently occupied it with intent to control it, or
(c) a person who is entitled to immediate occupation of the land, if no
other person is in possession under clauses (a) and (b).
Id. § 328E; see also People v. Berliner, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1942, 1943 (Yonkers City
Ct. 1978) (only the possessor may sue for trespass).
13. In LAL v. CBS, Inc., 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit ruled that the
owner of rental property in Pennsylvania could not bring a trespass suit against broad-
casters who entered the property at the invitation of the tenants. Id. at 100. Under
Pennsylvania law, "the lessor of improved land who is out of possession of the prop-
erty cannot maintain" a trespass action unless he proves injury to a reversionary inter-
est. Id.; see also Merz v. Professional Health Control of Augusta, Inc., 175 Ga. App.
110, 332 S.E.2d 333 (1985) (lessees, as possessors, may consent to filming of commercials
on private property).
14. In Wood v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1610 (Iowa Dist.
Ct. 1986), the owner of farmland apparently delegated his possessory interest to a
brother who then had the authority to invite others onto the land. Wood is unusual
because the court found a sheriff gained possession of the property once his investiga-
tion began. Id. at 1614; see also State v. Gordon, 437 A.2d 855 (Me. 1981) (manager of a
shop can delegate authority to police to evict boisterous customers); Waiters v. State,
691 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (security guard hired to protect property has right
of possession in trespass suit against burglar).
An authorized agent may make access decisions for a person in possession of prop-
erty who lacks the capacity to consent due to youth, Robalina v. Armstrong, 15 Barb.
Ch. 247 (N.Y. Ch. 1852); intoxication, McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883); or mental
incompetence, Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). See W. PROSSER & P. KEE-
TON ON TORTS 114 (5th ed. 1984).
A. Explicit Consent
Consent may be explicit or implied. The possessor of property may
extend explicit consent by oral invitation 15 or by written agree-
ment. 16 Journalists are accustomed to acquiring written consent
from officials and residents of mental institutions' 7 and prisons18
where the state seeks to protect the privacy of residents. Standard
practice at some television stations requires journalists to secure con-
sent before entering someone's home.19
In newsworthy emergency situations-fires, raids, and medical ca-
lamities-the owner or possessor seldom expressly invites a journal-
ist onto private property. Owners may, however, expressly invite the
officials whom the journalists accompany. For example, in Miller v.
NBC,20 Ms. Miller invited paramedics by phone to her California
home to aid her husband who was having a heart attack. A journalist
accompanied paramedics into the Miller's home. Express consent to
officials, however, does not constitute consent, express or implied, for
anyone who might accompany them.21 The California Court of Ap-
peal held that one telephoning for emergency medical attention
"does not thereby 'open the door' for persons without any clearly
identifiable and justifiable official reason who may wish to enter the
premises where the medical aid is being administered."22
15. Tenants give explicit consent when they invite the media onto their premises.
LAL v. CBS, Inc., 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984); Merz v. Professional Health Control of
Augusta, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 110, 332 S.E.2d 333 (1985).
16. A Kansas appellate court found that a signed release by a business partner
constitutes valid written consent for journalists accompanying a health inspector into
nonpublic parts of a restaurant if the signature is not induced by misrepresentation.
Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (consent in-
duced through misrepresentation is a question for the jury).
17. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249 N.E.2d 610 (Mass. 1969); Delan v. CBS,
Inc., 91 A.D.2d 255, 458 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
18. E.g., Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982) (administrative regula-
tions at Pontiac Correctional Center require reporters to obtain a "resident's" signa-
ture on consent form, witnessed by a department staff member, before the resident
can be interviewed or photographed).
19. E.g., Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1475, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 673 (1986).
20. Id. In Miller, Ms. Miller was taken by police to another room in the home she
shared with her husband while a KNBC film crew, apparently without Ms. Miller's
knowledge, filmed efforts to save her husband's life. Id. at 1469, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
Ms. Miller and her daughter sued for trespass, invasion of privacy and infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 1470, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 670. Reinstating the suit on appeal,
Judge Hanson wrote: "[T]he obligation not to make unauthorized entry into the pri-
vate premises of individuals like the Millers does not place an impermissible burden
on news gatherers, nor is it likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights." Id. at 1492-93, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
21. 75 AM JUR. 2D Torts § 41 (1974).
22. Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1489-90, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 683; see also Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (per curiam). But see Wood v. Fort Dodge Messenger,
13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1610 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 1986). According to the court, Duane
Wood, who had been asked by his brother to look after his farm, gave express permis-
sion to the sheriff to enter the farm and to accompany members of the media onto the
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B. Implied Consent
Consent in cases where media representatives accompany officials
into private dwellings is said to be implied. Consent may be implied
either from some relationship between two parties that indicates con-
sent, or from the custom of the community without regard to any re-
lationship between the parties. 23 Where a landowner is aware of a
trespass, consent may be implied from silence, acquiescence, or some
other conduct between parties, including conversations. Customs of
the community are taken into account in determining whether a rea-
sonable person would understand the conduct to indicate consent. 24
1. Conversations
Consent is held to be implied when the possessor of property will-
ingly engages in conversation with a trespasser. The Missouri Court
of Appeals states that "[o]ne who silently watches another enter
upon the former's land and then willingly engages the latter in con-
versation while standing upon the premises may not later be heard to
complain of trespass. ' '25 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has held that the manager of a company gave explicit
consent to a journalist to remain on private property when he di-
rected the journalist to the front office to conduct an interview.2 6
There are no reported cases of journalists accompanying officials
where the possessor of the property, after engaging the journalist in
conversation, indicated a willingness that the journalist should enter.
There are, however, cases in which the media argue that consent by
the owner was implied through the householder's silence or
acquiescence.
2. Silence
Silence or acquiescence indicating consent may be manifest in re-
peated entries over a long period. Store owners imply consent for
property. Id. at 1614. The court decided that officials could invite journalists onto the
property because they had possession of it. Id.
23. Consent may be implied "from custom, local or general, from usage, or from
the conduct of the parties or some relationship between them." F. HARPER, F. JAMES
& 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.11, at 40 (2d ed. 1986).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 comment d (1977). Customs are partic-
ularly important in determining implied consent when one of the parties is silent or
inactive. Id.
25. Boling Concrete Constr. Co. v. Townsend, 686 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Mo. App. 1985).
26. Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986).
shoppers and browsers to enter when they open their doors and pas-
sively welcome all who enter day after day.27 Railroad companies
and other property owners imply consent to trespass when their
agents or employees continually permit the public to traverse com-
pany land or to ride company transportation for free. One court
ruled that a railroad company that repeatedly permitted the public to
cross a trestle "may be said to have recognized that use after it knew,
or under the circumstances should have known, of it."28 The com-
pany consented to the trespasses because it was silent when large
numbers of people crossed the trestle "openly, visibly, and continu-
ously" over a "long period of time."29 In these cases of implied con-
sent, the owner of the property or its agent knows of the entries onto
the property and either welcomes them or fails to protest; therefore,
it is reasonable to imply consent from a relationship between the
parties.30
Consent by homeowners and apartment dwellers to entries by
journalists accompanying officials cannot be implied by a long-term
relationship between the two parties.31 Journalists entering private
homes with officials usually do not know the property owner. Nor
has the owner or agent watched or acquiesced to a repeated entry
over a long period. Unlike the relationship between shopowners and
shoppers, householders have no direct experience silently watching
journalists enter their houses or curtilage.
Consent can be implied, not only from a relationship or familiarity
established over a long period, but also from a single occurrence if
the circumstances suggest consent is intended. A housewife was
found to have implied consent to the presence of magazine fashion
photographers in her house when, upon returning home, she "made
no meaningful effort to protect her privacy or demonstrated no visi-
ble emotional distress, but rather acquiesced in the continued pres-
ence" of the photographers that her children had admitted.3 2 The
photographers entered peacefully, and there was no question of their
identity.33
Journalists claim that householders give implied consent by re-
maining silent when journalists accompany officials on raids and
27. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON ON TORTS 419 (5th ed. 1984).
28. J. Ray Arnold Lumber Co. v. Carter, 91 Fla. 548, 560, 108 So. 815, 819 (1926).
29. Id.
30. See Note, The Doctrine of Custom and Usage as a Defense for Trespassing
Newsmen: Florida Publishing Co. v. Fetcher, 30 FED. COMM. L.J. 77, 82-83 (1977).
31. This was the conclusion of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Prahl v.
Brosamle. 98 Wis. 2d 130, 147-49, 295 N.W.2d 768, 779 (1980).
32. Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1971).
33. Id.
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searches.3 4 Indeed, it is reasonable to imply consent when a house-
holder's silence clearly signals consent. For example, it is reasonable
to assume that television producer Ruben Norte was given implied
consent to remain on private property when "no one objected" after
he responded forthrightly to questions about why he and other jour-
nalists were accompanying officials into private homes.35 More often
though, householders may be too confused or intimidated to ask who
is accompanying officials and upon asking, may get noncommittal re-
sponses to their inquiries. In such circumstances, it is not reasonable
to imply consent by the householder.
Courts generally rule that consent cannot be implied where the
householders do not know who is entering their property, particu-
larly in tense and disorienting circumstances such as a raid or fire.
The California Court of Appeal found no consent, in Ms. Miller's si-
lence when paramedics and a camera crew entered during a time of
"vulnerability and confusion."36 Similarly, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals ruled it would be unreasonable to imply consent to entry by
a journalist from the silence of one under the "distracting circum-
stances" of a raid, especially when the householder did not know that
the man carrying a camera was a journalist.37 Similarly, a federal
court in Wisconsin found no consent in a householder's silence after
raiding police responded vaguely, "[s]he's with us," to the house-
holder's inquiry into who was accompanying them.38 The woman
with the officials was a reporter.3 9
Although courts in cases involving media and officials have done
little more than assert that consent may not be implied by a home-
34. Trespass, Intrusion Claims Stand, 11 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 22 (Summer
1987). See Prahl, 98 Wis. 2d at 149-50, 295 N.W.2d at 780.
35. Norte said he was questioned about "half the time" when he and an NBC film
crew entered houses to film a documentary on paramedics and that he always re-
sponded, but "no one objected." Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1474-75, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 673 (1986). The California court did not have to rule whether silence in such
circumstances constitutes consent.
36. Id. at 1484, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Ms. Miller did not ask about the journalists'
presence because she was in a different room at the time of the entry.
37. Prahl, 98 Wis. 2d at 150, 295 N.W.2d at 780. Dr. Helmut Prahl, a scientist,
thought the television journalist carrying a camera was employed by the police depart-
ment. Id. at 136, 295 N.W.2d at 773.
38. See NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, supra note 34, at 22. Two experts say consent
for a private policeman to search or intrude in an injured person's property "should be
nullified if it was given because he mistakenly thought that the private security man
was a policeman." J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, IV THE LAW AND PRIVATE POLICE 9
(Law Enforcement Assistance Admin. 1971).
39. NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, supra note 34, at 22.
owner's silence, the law supports the conclusion that consent to jour-
nalists' entries should not be implied by silence in stressful
situations. Under constitutional law, consent to a warrantless entry
by officials is not implied if derived from coercion or intimidation;
consent must be "freely and voluntarily given." 40 In common law,
too, consent is not implied if a property owner merely submits to offi-
cial authority4l or remains silent because he thinks that protest will
be futile.42 Such is the case when journalists follow blue uniforms
into private homes on raids, searches, and emergencies.
Officials entering private property during a raid or fire do not need
consent of the homeowner and, indeed, do not find it in the house-
holder's silence.43 Police enter forcefully whether they are acting
lawfully or not. "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to
search a home under a warrant," the Supreme Court states, "he an-
nounces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.
The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coer-
cion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent."44 This is
usually the case where police barge into a home to make an arrest or
conduct a search. The entry of officials and those who accompany
them may be perceived by the householder as entry sanctioned by
law. In coercive, disorienting circumstances, it is unreasonable to im-
ply consent to entry by journalists from a householder's silence.
III. CUSTOM AND USAGE
Consent may be implied, not only from some relationship between
the property owner and the trespasser but also, as in Fletcher, from
custom and usage. The consent recognized in Fletcher was not based
on any relationship between the property owner, Ms. Fletcher, and
the photojournalist, Cranford, who accompanied Jacksonville officials
into her fire-damaged home. Ms. Fletcher was not home at the time
of the entry and presumably would have objected to the journalist's
entry had she been there. Furthermore, Ms. Fletcher testified to
having no special knowledge about customs concerning press entries
40. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Duress is an important de-
fense in the criminal law. Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal
Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1957).
41. "As to false imprisonment or battery, it is clear that yielding to a threat of
force, or the assertion of legal authority, must be treated as no consent at all, but sub-
mission against the plaintiff's will; and the same is undoubtedly true as to trespass or
conversion." W. PROSSER & P. KEETON ON TORTS 121 (5th ed. 1984).
42. "[I]t is generally agreed that the mere toleration of continued intrusion where
objection or interference would be burdensome or likely to be futile, as in the case of
habitual trespasses on railroad tracks, is not in itself and without more a manifestation
of consent." Id. at 144. What is true of habitual intrusion would also be true of a sin-
gle entry under tense and confusing conditions.
43. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
44. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
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into private homes. Presumably, no journalist had ever entered her
property before, and she was familiar with no custom allowing jour-
nalists to enter private property without the owner's consent.45
Thus, the consent created by custom and usage on which the Fletcher
court relies is a privilege created by-law in which a householder's si-
lence-in this case, Ms. Fletcher's absence--cannot reasonably be in-
terpreted as consent. Where privileges are created by law, it may not
matter that the absent or silent property owner disagrees with the
"custom" as did Ms. Fletcher.
The consent recognized by the Fletcher court is similar to the nine-
teenth century privilege accorded cattle owners to graze their stock
on open pastureland owned by others.46 The Fletcher privilege is also
like that possessed by citizens in the nineteenth century to hunt and
fish in private ponds without consent of the owner.4 7 Such privileges
were created by law regardless of an individual property owner's
knowledge or approval. Only if property owners fenced or posted
their land could they exclude trespassers who otherwise had a privi-
lege in custom and usage to enter.-
A privilege to trespass is created by custom and usage when the so-
cial purpose of the trespass outweighs the property owner's posses-
sory interests. On the American plains in the nineteenth century,
the public policy of settling a land that was too vast to fence economi-
cally outweighed individual landowners' interests in excluding neigh-
bors' cattle from their property.48 More recently, courts have
recognized a privilege based on custom for salesmen, 49 deliverymen,50
religious proselytizers,51 and neighbors52 to enter private land with-
45. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 917 (Fla. 1976).
46. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890); Seeley v. Peters, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 130
(1848); C., H. & D.R.R. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 425 (1854).
47. See, e.g., Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626 (1878).
48. "The existence or enforcement of such a [trespass] law would have greatly re-
tarded the settlement of the country, and have been against the policy of both the gen-
eral and the state governments." Buford, 133 U.S. at 330 (1890). The practice of letting
cattle run at large was sometimes considered a right. See Waterson, 4 Ohio St. at 432
(1854).
Trespass laws on the plains were not in harmony "with the genius, spirit and objects
of our institutions." Seely, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) at 142. The privilege for cattle to roam was
consistent with "contemporaneous construction and acquiescence." Id. at 145.
49. E.g., Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938); City of Osceola v. Blair, 231
Iowa 770, 2 N.W.2d 83 (1942); Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W.
664 (1940). But see Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936),
appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937).
50. E.g., Keeseker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 68 Ohio App. 505, 42 N.E.2d 223 (1941),
rev'd on other grounds, 141 Ohio St. 162, 47 N.E.2d 211 (1943).
51. E.g., Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678 (1943).
out consent to deliver a message, ask for information, or to drop off a
package.
Such privileges serve the publicly acknowledged purposes of al-
lowing salesmen to make a living,53 proselytizers to state their mis-
sion,54 householders to receive information,55 and for all to carry out
"the common purposes of life."5 6 As long as an entry is peaceful, is
not conducted in defiance of a "no trespassing" sign, and does not go
beyond the threshold of a house, custom and usage establish a privi-
lege to trespass as long as the property owner does not object and
even though the possessor of property may later disapprove.
One of the most elusive aspects of a privilege based on custom and
usage is determining what Justice Holmes called "the habits of the
country" 57 on which a privilege is based. It is difficult to determine
whether a practice is sufficiently common to be recognized in law be-
cause the privilege rests in part on public opinion.58 Disagreement is
certain concerning the scope of the privilege and the underlying so-
cial policy.59 Defining the privilege is made more difficult because
customs may shift with changing economic and social conditions.6 0
52. E.g., Boston Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornalski, 234 So. 2d 386 (Fla. App. 1970).
53. See, e.g., Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 21, 180 So. 347, 356 (1938); DeBerry v. City
of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940). The right to earn a living "is funda-
mental, natural, inherent, and is one of the most sacred and valuable rights of a citi-
zen." Id. at 79, 8 S.E.2d at 150.
54. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943); Richardson,
313 Mass. at 638, 48 N.E.2d at 683.
55. Martin, 319 U.S. at 149.
56. Writing expansively, Justice Holmes said "entry upon another's close, or into
his house, at usual and reasonable hours, and in a customary manner, for any of the
common purposes of life, cannot be regarded as a trespass." Riley v. Harris, 177 Mass.
163, 164, 58 N.E. 584, 584 (1900) (quoting Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 198, 220
(1852)).
57. McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922).
58. See Seeley v. Peters, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 130, 153 (1848) (Clayton, J., dissenting).
59. Judge Clayton in Seeley argued on policy grounds against a privilege for roam-
ing cattle. As a matter of political economy, Judge Clayton asserted it would be better
law to protect crops which might be damaged by a trespassing cow than to protect the
open range. "One acre in tillage is of more value than many acres of wild grass." Id.
at 150 (Clayton, J., dissenting). Defending the common law of the time, Judge Clayton
said, "This principle of the common law was most unquestionably the law of natural
justice, when it originated, for it secures to each one the quiet enjoyment of his own,
without intrusion or molestation from another." Id. at 151 (Clayton, J., dissenting).
Judge Clayton objected to the alteration of the common law by burdening one person
for the benefit of another without consent and saw danger in letting the law be deter-
mined by appeal to popular opinion. Id. at 151-53 (Clayton, J., dissenting).
60. While social policy dictated against holding owners of livestock liable for the
trespasses of their animals on the vast plains of nineteenth century America, it became
reasonable to hold them liable when the land became more populated, more valuable,
and more economical to fence. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court, which had upheld the
privilege of cattle roaming in C., H & D.R.R. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 425 (1854),
changed its mind by 1908. See Marsh v. Koons, 78 Ohio St. 68, 84 N.E. 599 (1908). Re-
ferring to a state trespass statute adopted in 1865, the Ohio court stated: "But condi-
tions changed, the larger part of the land having been brought under cultivation, the
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Recognizing a privilege for journalists to enter a home is particularly
problematical because custom and usage usually create a privilege
only to enter private property to the threshold of the house, not to
enter the interior.
To determine whether a trespass is sufficiently customary to be
privileged by law, courts consider the frequency of the entry,
whether the practice has been challenged by litigants, and whether
the social purpose outweighs the intrusion on the property. 61 On
none of these grounds could a court conclude that the law should cre-
ate a privilege for journalists to enter private homes when the house-
holder does not consent.
A. Frequency of Entries
The Florida Supreme Court was impressed by the number of affi-
davits submitted by the news media and law enforcement agencies at-
testing to the frequency with which journalists peacefully enter
private property at the scene of a calamity when invited by officials.
Several media and law enforcement organizations submitted affida-
vits attesting to the commonness of journalists accompanying officials
into private places.62 In other cases, media organizations have testi-
fied to the frequency with which journalists accompany officials on
raids, searches, and other entries onto private property.63
A trespass, like any tort, is not privileged simply because it occurs
often; and an illegal practice will not become privileged just because
public welfare required that the burden be transferred to the owners of the cattle." Id.
at 70, 84 N.E. at 600.
Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court, which in 1878 recognized a privilege for a
fisherman to fish in a private pond, Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626 (1878), saw no need
to recognize such a privilege in 1917. Winans v. Willetts, 197 Mich. 512, 163 N.W. 993
(Mich. 1917).
61. Privileges created by law, irrespective of consent, are either conditional privi-
leges serving an important social value or are absolute privileges providing function-
aries the freedom necessary to the performance of their duties. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 comment d (1965). The absolute privilege belongs primarily
to the judiciary, witnesses, jurors, and counsel who aid in the administration of law.
Id. If journalists have a privilege to trespass, it is a conditional privilege to further
first amendment interests by reporting public affairs. To be recognized in law, the so-
cial values served by the privilege must be of such importance "as to justify the harm
caused or threatened by its exercise." Id. § 10.
62. Affidavits were filed in Fletcher by the Duval County Sheriff, the Florida At-
torney General, ABC-TV, the Associated Press, The Washington Post, and several
other news organizations. Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914, 916 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
63. See, e.g., Anderson v. WROC-TV, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1987, 1992 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1981).
it is often repeated. An entry that is frequently repeated may be a
nuisance rather than a privileged activity.64 Affidavits from media
and law enforcement agencies are self-serving sources for asserting
public approbation of journalists accompanying officials onto private
property. Some courts are unwilling to recognize a custom allowing
journalists to enter private property when property owners them-
selves do not testify to the commonness of the practice. A Wisconsin
appellate court held that newscasters "cannot establish a right to
enter the lands of others without taking into account the reaction of
the landowners."65 In a New York case in which a television news
manager submitted the only affidavit, the supreme court found that
implied consent is not created "by asserting that it exists and without
evidence to support it."66 If a privilege is to be implied by the owner
or created by law, affidavits are needed from affected householders,
attesting to the frequency of journalists accompanying officials into
private dwellings.
Fletcher does not, however, rely entirely on the implied consent of
householders to permit entry by journalists. In fact, the Fletcher
privilege allowing journalists to trespass depends more on the invita-
tion to journalists made by officials than on implied consent of prop-
erty owners. Without the invitation from officials, the Fletcher court
would have found no privilege in favor of journalists. The court
noted both the absence of objection to the entry and also that "there
was an invitation to enter by the officers investigating the fire."67
The Florida court even suggested that officials might have invited the
photographer onto the property if Ms. Fletcher had been home to ob-
ject.68 Other courts, not recognizing a privilege for journalists to
enter private property, have distinguished Fletcher because of the in-
vitation extended by Florida officials to journalists.6 9
Several courts since Fletcher have followed the common law more
closely by ruling that an official who lawfully enters property in an
emergency has no general power to invite others, including journal-
ists, onto the property. 70 Both common law and constitutional law
64. See, e.g., Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456 (1936), appeal
dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937).
65. Prahl v. Brosanle, No. 82-1753, slip op. at 8 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1983) (un-
published opinion), appealed from, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980). Un-
published opinions have no precedential value in Wisconsin. Prahl v. Brosamle, 116
Wis. 2d 694, 343 N.W.2d 826 (Ct. App. 1983).
66. Anderson, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1992.
67. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 917.
69. See, e.g., Prahl v. Brosmale, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 149, 295 N.W.2d 708, 780 (Ct. App.
1983).
70. "[A] law enforcement officer is not as a matter of law endowed with the right
or authority to invite people of his choosing to invade private property and participate
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severely restrict the authority of officials to invite even other officials
onto private property.
Officials, as Ms. Fletcher acknowledged, are privileged to enter pri-
vate property in an emergency without consent of the possessor. 7 1
Police are privileged under both common law and constitutional law
to enter without consent to make an arrest 7 2 and to save lives and
property.7 3  The Supreme Court states: "A burning building of
course creates an exigency that justifies a warrantless entry by fire
officials to fight the blaze."7 4 Indeed, an officer may have a duty to
enter private property in an emergency.75
Fire and police officials may invite private citizens onto the prop-
in a midnight raid of the premises." Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broad-
casting, Inc., 327 So. 2d 810, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (emphasis in original).
Although otherwise trespassory conduct may be legalized or justified by law-
ful authority, such as an officer of the law acting in the performance of his
duty [citation omitted], such authority does not extend by invitation, absent an
emergency, to every and any other member of the public, including members
of the news media.
Anderson v. WROC-TV, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1987, 1989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
In Prahl v. Brosamle, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals said that a police officer has
no authority to invite a journalist onto private property. 98 Wis. 2d at 154-55, 295
N.W.2d at 782. A new trial was ordered to determine whether the officer's statement
that Brosamle could "come forward" when the situation was under control repre-
sented consent for Brosamle to proceed or simply an indication of no objection by the
officer. If it was consent, the officer might be ruled to be a co-trespasser. Id.
71. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918.
72. Law enforcement officers may enter private property without a warrant to,
among other things, prevent the destruction of evidence and pursue a suspect. Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Entry onto private property to make an arrest for a
criminal offense is also privileged in the common law of trespass. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 204 (1965).
A private person, including a journalist, is privileged in common law to enter land to
avert an imminent public disaster, id § 196; or to prevent serious harm to himself or
the possessor, unless the actor knows the possessor on whose behalf he is acting does
not want him on the property, id. § 197. "Where a conflagration is raging, a person
may lawfully enter upon another's premises in order to save others, and he is not re-
garded as a trespasser. [citations omitted] In other situations necessity, especially in
the interest of preservation of human life, will legally excuse or justify trespass."
State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 297, 128 N.W.2d 645, 651-52 (1964); see also Larco Drilling
& Exploration Corp. v. Brown, 267 So. 2d 308 (Miss. 1972).
73. "The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the
course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of
others." Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99. "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (quoting Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). The government bears the burden of show-
ing the existence of an exceptional situation to justify official entry. Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979).
74. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984).
75. For example, an officer called to a home may have a duty to enter and lend
erty to help make an arrest.76 Officials may also invite "experts"
such as a deputy fire marshal or chemical expert onto private prop-
erty to insure that an extinguished fire is unlikely to rekindle or
cause an explosion.77 A journalist, like any other citizen, may be re-
quired to assist an officer to make an arrest 78 or help an official in an
emergency.79 "From earliest times, an officer charged with the duty
of preserving the peace and arresting offenders has had the authority
to call upon bystanders to assist him."80 A citizen acting in good faith
does not have to inquire into the authority of the officer making an
arrest and, in such circumstances, the citizen is protected from liabil-
ity if the officer acts illegally.81 Accordingly, if citizens cannot refuse
to render aid, they should not be liable if they participate in an unau-
thorized arrest.8 2
Journalists are not typically invited onto private property to assist
with an arrest or to render aid in an emergency, but often are invited
to gather information after an emergency is over. Officials customa-
rily do not have the authority to invite anyone of their choosing onto
private property during or after an emergency. Officials on private
property are usually licensees8 3 with the limited authority to perform
their ministerial duties8 4 and then to leave.85 Officers who enter
assistance if he sees a body through a window and no one answers the door. State v.
Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964).
76. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON ON TORTS 154 (5th ed. 1984). "An officer may call
upon private persons to assist him in making any arrest, and those who do so will be
privileged, even though the officer himself is without authority, so long as he is known
to be a peace officer." Id.; see Note, The Private Person's Duty to Assist the Police in
Arrest, 13 Wyo. L.J. 72 (1958).
77. When firemen are not trained to handle explosives, they may call in police
with special expertise to evaluate chemicals used to manufacture explosives and
"render safe" the premises. United States v. Urban, 710 F.2d 276, 279 (6th Cir. 1983).
78. See Note, supra note 76, at 74.
79. This usually occurs when an officer acting alone could not make an arrest. Id.;
see also Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941).
80. Id. at 498, 35 N.E.2d at 165-66.
81. Peterson v. Robison, 43 Cal. 2d 690, 697, 277 P.2d 19, 24 (1954); see also J.
FERDICO, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER 23 (2d ed. 1979).
82. Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, 379, 38 N.W. 885, 886 (1888).
83. Some jurisdictions treat officials as invitees of the possessor to whom the pos-
sessor owes a higher duty of care. Others treat a firefighter entering private property
as sui generis. See Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 236 Kan. 570, 573, 694 P.2d 433,
437 (1985); Annotation, Liability of Owner or Occupant of Premises to Fireman Com-
ing Thereon in Discharge ofHis Duty, 11 A.L.R. 4th 597 (1982).
84. Ministerial acts performed in response to orders instead of on individual dis-
cretion include the seizure of property, arrest, the denial of a building permit, and an
investigation. Antkiewicz v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 91 Mich App. 389, 398, 283 N.W.2d
749, 753-54 (1979).
85. Whatever authority an official has to be on private property, "[w]hen the
search is over, any license to remain on the premises lapses. The police then have only
a bare temporary license to search and do not acquire any further legal interest to sus-
tain a trespass action." People v. Berliner, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1942, 1944 (Yonkers
City Ct. 1978).
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property illegally, remain longer than they are authorized, conduct
unauthorized searches, or invite unauthorized personnel onto the
property, may themselves become trespassers86 liable for the damage
they and their invitees cause.87 Instead of having the authority to in-
vite whomever they choose to enter private property, officials have a
duty to secure private property from unauthorized entry by
outsiders.88
B. Lack of Litigation
In addition to considering the frequency of a trespass when deter-
mining a privilege, courts may also consider lack of litigation as evi-
dence that a practice is generally accepted. Since the nineteenth
century, courts have cited a lack of plaintiffs as evidence that a prac-
tice is commonly accepted.8 9 The Fletcher court considered the tres-
pass by the photojournalist a case of first impression.90 "This, in
itself, tends to indicate that the practice has been accepted by the
general public since it is a widespread practice of long-standing." 91
While lack of litigation may indicate public acceptance of a prac-
tice, it also may be explained by other reasons. The California Court
of Appeal suggests the lack of intrusion cases may result not from
widespread acceptance of the practice, but from public recognition
86. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 41 (1974). "Person who cooperates, instigates, com-
mands, encourages, ratifies, condones, or aids, assists, or advises the commission of a
trespass is liable as a cotrespasser." J. DOOLEY, 3 MODERN TORT LAW § 40.04 (1984).
87. The common law holds public officials as well as private citizens liable for
trespass, intrusion, and other torts that invade privacy. Under the rarely invoked doc-
trine of trespass ab initio, an official who enters property legally but becomes a tres-
passer may be liable for any damages resulting from the beginning of his entry. W.
PROSSER & P. KEETON ON TORTS 151 (5th ed. 1984).
88. Where fire-prone buildings come under state control, officials may be negli-
gent if they permit entry by unauthorized people. Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
State, 164 N.W.2d 699 (Mich. App. 1968); see also People v. Berliner, 3 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1942, 1943 (Yonkers City Ct. 1978) (police have duty to bar admission of tres-
passers during a search). However, in Anderson v. WHEC-TV, 92 A.D.2d 747, 748, 461
N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 N.Y. App. Div. (1983), a New York appeals court found that a peace
officer executing a search warrant had no duty to prevent unlawful entry of journal-
ists where the officer told the journalists he had no authority to invite them onto the
property. In Anderson, the officer who did not object to the journalists' trespass was
not himself a trespasser. Id.
89. Seeley v. Peters, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 130, 142 (1848). "No man has questioned this
right [to let cattle roam], although hundreds of cases must have occurred where the
owners of cattle have escaped the payment of damages." Id.; see also Prior v. White,
132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (1938) (salespeople solicited 100 homes without complaint).
90. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918-19.
91. Id.
that such entry is improper.92 The court explains that most individu-
als do not enter private homes without the occupant's consent unless
they are acting in "some clearly identified official capacity."9 3 People
understand "widely held notions of decency preclude" entry; "most
individuals understand that to do so is either a tort, a crime, or
both."94
The California court's reasoning perhaps better explains why jour-
nalists sometimes forego accompanying officials into private homes
rather than why so few people sue journalists who do enter.
"[W]idely held notions of decency" may deter intrusions by journal-
ists but would not explain why victims of trespass or intrusion do not
sue.95 If journalists' frequent entry into private homes with officials
violates widely held notions of decency, one might anticipate many
suits for trespass and intrusion.
The reason relatively few people sue over trespass and invasion of
privacy may lie in the adequacy of the legal system to compensate
successful litigants for their loss of privacy and possessory interests
to trespassers. As Gavison suggests, the relative rarity of privacy
suits might generally be explained "by expectations that such injuries
are not covered by law, by the fact that many invasions of privacy are
not perceived by victims, and by the feeling that legal remedies are
inappropriate, in part because the initiation of legal action itself in-
volves the additional loss of privacy."96 What is true of privacy may
also be true of trespass, which is often antecedent to a privacy claim.
Victims of trespass may be discouraged from using the courts be-
cause litigation may yield only nominal or insufficient compensatory
damages. Such damages are hardly an incentive for a would-be plain-
tiff or an attorney working on a contingency basis. Victims of tres-
pass may be discouraged from suing for larger punitive damages or
damages for intrusion and emotional distress because litigation will
further publicize the private matters. Furthermore, victims of tres-
pass or invasion of privacy may consider monetary damages inappro-
priate compensation for the violation of their property and the shame
and degradation suffered. Thus, there may be few trespass and pri-
vacy suits against the media since the law is not attuned to protecting
dignity and self-respect, both of which are violated by trespass and
invasions of privacy.97
A victim of a trespass or invasion of privacy may also consider a




96. Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY 372 (F. Schoeman ed. 1984).
97. Id. at 373-74.
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suit against the media futile because of the frequency with which
newsworthiness and first amendment values prevail. Potential plain-
tiffs may also feel it is futile to sue journalists whose trespass or in-
trusion merits a government sanction. Finally, many whose houses
are intruded upon may be too poor to consider contacting an
attorney.
Whatever the reason for the relatively few trespass and privacy
cases against the media, the number is increasing, thus undermining
the conclusion in Fletcher that infrequent litigation indicates public
acceptance of trespassing journalists. Since Fletcher, several courts
have recognized a cause of action against journalists for trespass, in-
trusion, and infliction of emotional distress.98 Juries have occasion-
ally awarded damages. 99
C. First Amendment Values Served by Trespass
In cases where landowners are aware of trespassers over a long pe-
riod of time, consent may be implied if the owner of the property de-
rives some benefit which makes it reasonable for a court to assume
that consent is intended. For example, drovers were said to have an
implied consent to ride trains for free in the nineteenth century to
tend their own cattle.1 00 Similarly, where the owner is not aware of
a trespass, social policy may justify a privilege in law. The policy of
settling the vast American plains in the nineteenth century justified
a privilege for a cattle owner to graze his herds on others' property,
despite occasional objections.1o1
If social policy is to justify a privilege for journalists to accompany
officials into private homes, that policy is based in the first amend-
ment and common law privileges for gathering news. One media
trespass defendant argued that a journalist's entry with officials,
causing no actual damage, is at most a technical trespass for which
journalists should not be liable when gathering news.102 Treating
trespass as an intrusion, one television station argued for a qualified
98. See supra notes 7 and 8 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
100. Waterbury v. New York C. & H.R.R., 17 F. 671 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1883). Similarly,
steamboat companies made employment more desirable and cheaper by acquiescing to
free transportation for former employees. See, e.g., Steamboat New World v. King, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 469 (1853).
101. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890); Seeley v. Peters, 10 Ill. (5 Gilm.) 130
(1848); C., H. & D.R.R. v. Waterson, 4 Ohio St. 425 (1854); see supra notes 45-61 and
accompanying text.
102. Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1453, 1480, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1986).
first amendment privilege which balances newsworthiness against
the degree of intrusion.1 03 Any other approach, the station argued,
"would border on prior restraint."' 04
However, only the Fletcher court has recognized the journalist's
newsgathering function as a rationale for creating a privilege to tres-
pass based on custom and usage. While not citing the first amend-
ment, the court noted that the photojournalist accompanying
Jacksonville officials gathered information on an important news-
worthy event. 0 5 The court also noted that the journalist helped offi-
cials take pictures and conduct a search for evidence of arson.106
Without question, journalists accompanying officials serve impor-
tant first amendment goals. Like journalists covering criminal court
proceedings-for which the Supreme Court has created a first
amendment right of access-journalists covering officials in private
homes monitor public officials, educate the public, develop public ac-
ceptance for the workings of government, and provide a "community
catharsis."10 7 Certainly, much of the reportage resulting from jour-
nalists' coverage of fires, raids, and other occurrences on private
property is protected speech about public issues and officials. Such
expression occupies the "highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values."108
While not denying the newsworthiness of many events which occur
on private property, courts since Fletcher have been reluctant to rec-
ognize a first amendment defense for trespassing or intruding jour-
nalists, whether or not journalists accompany officials. Some courts
suggest balancing a householder's privacy against a journalist's first
103. Anderson v. WROC-TV, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1987, 1990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981); see also Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Ct. App.
1980).
104. Anderson, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1990. WROC-TV argued for an absolute
first amendment privilege. Id. at 1998.
105. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918.
106. Id.
107. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980).
108. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). Concerning his coverage of drug raids, Geraldo Ri-
vera stated: "We were covering the law enforcement [officers] doing their job." Live
on the Vice Beat, TIME, Dec. 22, 1986, at 60. As a monitor of official conduct, a re-
porter, by his presence, may prevent official misconduct, help plaintiffs in civil rights
suits against police, or clear officials of charges of civil rights violations. See NATIONAL
NEWS COUNCIL, COVERING CRIME: How MUCH PRESS-POLICE COOPERATION? How LIT-
TLE? 12 (1981).
James Cole, an attorney for WISC in Madison, Wisconsin, justifies broadcasters ac-
companying police during a 5:00 a.m. raid on a private home by saying: "They wanted
people in southern Wisconsin to know what it's like when police come bursting in at 5
in the morning." Rogers & Callender, Jurors Award Couple $25,000 in Privacy Law-
suit, The Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Jan. 10, 1987, at 3, col. 1. Cole added that it
was not the station's coverage of the arrest that caused plaintiff emotional distress, but
the public notice of her husband's arrest. Id.
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amendment rights to gather news.109 Most courts, however, usually
reject such balancing and rely instead on language in Dietemann v.
Time,110 that the first amendment does not permit tortious news-
gathering."' In rejecting a first amendment privilege for journalists
to enter private property, the courts also cite the Supreme Court's
dictum in Branzburg v. Hayes"1 2 that "[n]ewsmen have no constitu-
tional right of access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the gen-
eral public is excluded .... -I13
While the Court's rationale for denying first amendment protec-
tion for trespassing or intruding newsgatherers is formulaic, it is con-
sistent with the weak first amendment right to gather news.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized a first amendment right
of access to courtrooms for the press and public,114 the right to gather
news is a weak entitlement relative to the constitutional right to
speak and publish. The right to gather, have access to, or receive in-
109. The New York Supreme Court found first amendment rights to gather news
do not exist "sovereign and independent of any balancing moral or social factor." Le
Mistral v. CBS, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1913, 1914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). In Le Mis-
tral, journalists trespassed by entering a restaurant without officials accompanying
them.
The Miller court suggested it would balance a homeowner's right of privacy with
journalists' first amendment interests in newsgathering and dissemination where a tel-
evision crew filmed and broadcast unsuccessful attempts by paramedics to resuscitate
the plaintiff's husband in the plaintiff's home. Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463,
1490, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 683 (1986). The California court noted that newsgathering, as
well as news dissemination, "may be within the protective ambit of the first amend-
ment." Id. at 1492, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 684 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681
(1972)); see also Note, Press Passes and Trespass: Newsgathering on Private Property,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 1298 (1984).
110. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (opinion by Hufstedler, J.).
111. "The first amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity
from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The first amend-
ment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the
precincts of another's home or office." Id. at 249 (cited in Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at
1490, 232 Cal, Rptr. at 683, and in Anderson v. WROC-TV, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA).
1987, 1990-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)); see also Le Mistral v. CBS, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep
(BNA) 1913, 1914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
112. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
113. Id. at 684-85; see Miller, 187 Cal. App. 3d at 1492, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685; Prahl v.
Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Ct. App. 1980). Without explana-
tion, the court in Miller ruled that privacy rights would prevail. 187 Cal. App. 3d at
1493, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685. Without analysis, the court also concluded that barring un-
authorized entries into private premises is unlikely "to have a chilling effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights." Id.; see also Note, The Rights of the Public and
the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
114. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The Supreme
Court noted in Branzburg v. Hayes that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
formation, though always an entitlement concurrent to the right to
speak and publish, has never been very potent except when it pro-
vides access to the courts.1 5 Even access to political speech-found
atop the hierarchy of constitutionally protected expression-has
been, at best, subsidiary to the right to speak and publish.116 Absent
a willing speaker (as is usually the case when the press seeks access
to private homes), the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create a
first amendment right to gather news.
D. Possession and Privacy
Even if the right of access for newsgatherers were a more devel-
oped doctrine, it would seldom justify a journalist's entry into a pri-
vate home or apartment. Unlike the courtroom, a home is not
dedicated to first amendment purposes, nor are first amendment ac-
tivities appropriate there.x17 Historically, a home, in contrast to a
court, has not been open to the press and public for discussion of pub-
lic affairs.118 The home or apartment is even less accessible for first
amendment activity, whether newsgathering or speech, than an army
base 1 9 or a jail120Opublic institutions which the Supreme Court has
ruled are not appropriate locations for expressive activities. The
householder is an absolute censor who may exclude the religious
proselytizer 121 and anyone else whom he or she does not wish to pass
115. The right to gather or receive information is a passive right that provides little
protection against government control. For example, while the first amendment pro-
tects commercial speech because of citizens' interests in receiving commercial informa-
tion, the Supreme Court holds that truthful advertising might be banned. Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
116. There is no first amendment right of access to (i.e., no right to gather informa-
tion from) government controlled records or meetings. See generally Stewart, Or of
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The First Amendment Right
to Gather State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980). Similarly, there is no first
amendment right to hear distinguished foreign intellectuals. Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972). Furthermore, the Supreme Court does not recognize a right of ac-
cess to accident scenes, as in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), nor to govern-
ment institutions other than courts, such as in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978).
117. The Supreme Court said the press and public have a first amendment right of
access to criminal trials because courtrooms have historically been places for open dis-
cussion of governmental affairs. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982). Because courtrooms have traditionally been open for debate on mat-
ters of governing importance, Chief Justice Burger suggested they take on the charac-
ter of a public forum. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 577-78.
118. Id. at 589.
119. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). "[I]t is... the business of a military instal-
lation ... to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum." Id. at 838.
120. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). "The State ... has power to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47.
"Traditional" public forums include streets and parks. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Lo-
cal Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
121. In Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943), the Court ruled "[a] city can
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the threshold.122 It does not matter that the person seeking entry
has a constitutionally protected right to speak.123
A court determining whether the customs of a community create a
privilege in law must consider whether the values served by the priv-
ilege are outweighed by the harm caused or threatened.124 The
householder's authority to exclude all would-be intruders, even those
exercising first amendment rights, is founded in the essential privacy
of the home. The possessory and privacy interests of the home, pro-
tected by common and constitutional law, create an expectation of
privacy that is not diluted by the entry of officials and journalists
during a news event.
The home with its curtilage is a special place where the sanctity of
privacy has been protected in constitutional and common law since
the 1700's. The fourth amendment protects both the property and
the privacy of the home from unreasonable government searches and
seizures. A person at home occupies a special zone with an expecta-
tion of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.125
"At the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasona-
punish those who call at a home [for speech purposes] in defiance of the previously
expressed will of the occupant."
122. The Supreme Court has never ruled on a person's right to speak in someone
else's private home, but Justice Harlan once observed that the right to freedom of
speech "would surely not encompass verbal expression in a private home if the owner
has not consented." Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 202 (1961) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Newsgathering can certainly have no stronger first amendment claim in the
home. See also Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
While stating that political solicitation is imbued with first amendment interests, the
Supreme Court upheld an ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors to depart imme-
diately when confronted with a no soliciting sign and described the ordinance as a nec-
essary measure to protect privacy. Id. at 639.
"Since a large part of the 'mission' of a private residence is precisely privacy and re-
pose, there can be no doubt that on balance the privacy interest outweighs the speech
interest [of those who would intrude to speak], so that no First Amendment right may
be recognized contrary to the wishes of the resident occupant." M. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4-121 (student ed. 1985).
123. A person in his home has "the very basic right to be free from sights, sounds,
and tangible matter" he does not want, even if protecting that privacy interest means
interfering with "the highly important right to communicate." Rowan v. United States
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). In Rowan, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a statute allowing a recipient of a mailed advertisement to require
the mailer to remove the recipient's name from the mailing list if the ad offered to sell
erotic material. Id. "[A] mailer's right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of an
unreceptive addressee." Id. at 736-37.
124. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
125. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
ble governmental intrusion."126 Homes have always "received special
protection in analysis under the Fourth Amendment."127 The home,
particularly one's bedroom, is a place where one does not expect
intruders.128
The law of trespass is said to protect property, not privacy.129
Nonetheless, the right to control property, as ensured by trespass
law, is based upon enduring American values (including privacy)
which originated in natural law. Early American state constitutions
proclaimed property as one of the natural rights of man.'30 Property
Was a key concept in the development of the theory of possessive in-
dividualism at the end of the seventeenth century.131
Societal views of property, particularly the homestead, are tradi-
tionally connected to a citizen's sense of autonomy and per-
sonhood.132 The home, whether a private dwelling or apartment is,
as Professor Radin suggests, "affirmatively part of oneself."133 Tres-
pass law protects not only property but also private interests by en-
suring, as Cooley said, that every man's castle is "sacred" against
unlicensed intrusion.134
As property ownership has consolidated under industrial capital-
ism, government regulation and taxation have diminished the
owner's absolute dominion over his economic property. 3 5 At the
same time, one's control over his domicile as a refuge and retreat has
taken on new importance. Trespass law helps ensure that journalists
126. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
127. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 90 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the Supreme Court re-
ferred to bedrooms as "sacred precincts" in which government officials have little right
to be. See also United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 816-17 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied,
734 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1984).
129. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984).
130. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 73 (J. Pennock & J. Chap-
man eds. 1980).
131. Donahue, The Future of The Concept of Property Predicted From Its Past, in
PROPERTY 40 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
132. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 992 (1982).
133. Id.
134. T. COOLEY, 2 COOLEY ON TORTS 649 (Lewis 3d ed. 1906). The action for tres-
pass from its origin was "intended to provide a remedy for an injury to property or to
the person." Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220, 221
(1917). The interest in private buildings is not simply a "property" interest, as the law
of trespass might suggest. As Nimmer says:
The term 'property' is a catch-all term for that bundle of rights which the law
ordinarily accords to one who has acquired 'title,' and is, therefore, a property
owner. Perhaps the most central of these is the right to exclude the world,
which is to say, a right of privacy over that domain in which a property inter-
est resides . . .which explains why there is no First Amendment right to
speak in or at the threshold of a private residence contrary to the occupant's
wishes.
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 4-118 to -119 (student ed. 1985).
135. Donahue, supra note 131, at 56.
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and others, who would claim new privileges for entry into the home,
will not diminish the value of the home as a shield from the outside
world. Cooley's observation that trespass law protects the quiet, con-
venience, and security of the dwelling place is still valid.136
The property owner or tenant does not lose the common law right
of possession or the constitutional right of privacy vis-a-vis officials
simply by being the victim of a calamity, raid, or tragedy. Unless
property is abandoned, the possessor retains possessory interests in it.
Property damaged by fire is not abandoned unless it is destroyed.13 7
Otherwise, property is not considered abandoned unless it is run-
down, unoccupied, and "wholly forsaken or deserted."138 The Florida
Supreme Court in Fletcher recognized that the fire did not terminate
Ms. Fletcher's possessory powers.1 3 9 The court felt that Ms. Fletcher
could have excluded the journalists had she been present.140 Of
course, government officials may also be denied entry if they have no
warrant and there is no emergency.141
The owner's power of possession and, therefore, the power to invite
and exclude, is not lost because the owner is absent during a fire or
other newsworthy event.142 Intrusion and trespass are still torts
136. T. COOLEY, 2 COOLEY ON TORTS 650 (Lewis 3d ed. 1906).
137. The Supreme Court has said that reasonable privacy expectations may remain
in fire-damaged premises. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (charging the
Cliffords with arson of their own home). "People may go on living in their homes or
working in their offices after a fire. Even when that is impossible, private effects often
remain on the fire-damaged premises." Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
505 (1978)). Even householders who set their own homes on fire retain sufficient pri-
vacy interests requiring a warrant for a criminal search once the exigencies have
passed. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505-06 (1978). When reasonable privacy
interests remain, the warrant requirement applies absent consent or exigent circum-
stances. C/ifford, 464 U.S. at 292-93.
138. State v. Miner, 637 P.2d 782, 784 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Henderson, 278 Pa. Super. 79, 419 A.2d 1366 (1980)).
139. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918. The Florida Supreme Court apparently recognized
Ms. Fletcher's possessory interests when it observed that implied consent for the
photojournalist to enter "would, of course, vanish" if the owner or possessor had in-
formed anyone not to enter. Id.
140. Id at 917. The Florida Supreme Court also believed police had the possessory
powers to invite the journalists into the home even if Ms. Fletcher had been present to
object. The court said that the police would have requested the photographer to take
the picture of the silhouette "even had the Plaintiff been there and objected." Id.
141. See, e.g., State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380 (Me. 1985) (holding that policeman
may arrive at a home in response to a neighbor's complaint of a disturbance, but ab-
sent exigent circumstances, the officer may not enter the house against the wishes of
the person in possession).
142. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984); see also Prince Furniture Co. v.
Stanfield, 386 So. 2d 1163 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980).
even though they occur when an owner or tenant is absent.143 One
does not abandon his property rights, including rights of possession,
"until he has been gone for a sufficiently long period of time that his
intention not to return may be inferred."144 Since the owner's pos-
sessory interests in his property remain even during his absence, fire
and police officials have no greater authority to conduct a warrant-
less search of a private residence when the owner is absent than if he
is present. So stringent are the fourth amendment restrictions on of-
ficials that one circuit has ruled fire officials need warrants after ex-
tinguishing a fire, even to secure valuable possessions from looters.145
The court stated it did not want a firefighter to have unbridled dis-
cretion "to decide whether or not to look through closets, drawers,
desks, personal papers, toiletries, bathrooms, or bedrooms ... with-
out any set standards to guide his decision."146 Surely, homeowners
retain a reasonable expectation that journalists and other private citi-
zens do not enjoy privileges to enter which are constitutionally for-
bidden to police and fire officials.
Finally, temporary control of private premises by public officials
does not generally open those premises for public access as did the
presence of firefighters and police officers in Fletcher.147 Prisons1 48
and accident scenes1 49 are under government control, but are not
open for public entry. Furthermore, the summoning of officials by a
householder is not "an invitation to the general public" that converts
a private home into a public place.150 On the contrary, even access to
public property may be tightly limited without violating constitu-
tional or common law. Instead of the presence of officials opening a
home to the public, officials may have a duty to exclude citizens to
preserve property and evidence as well as to avoid charges of trespass
and intrusion. 5 1 Private persons may not do what an official is pro-
143. C/ifford, 464 U.S. at 292; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21,
132 S.E.2d 206 (1963).
144. Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 426 A.2d 126, 127 (Pa. Super. 1981).
145. U.S. v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 816 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 734 F.2d 1481
(1984).
146. Id.
147. Besides the photojournalist Cranford, "numerous members of the general pub-
lic also went through the burned house" with officials. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d at 918.
148. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
149. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1978).
150. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22 (1984) (per curiam); see also Miller v.
NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1490-91, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 683 (1986).
151. In one fourth amendment case, the Ninth Circuit rejected a lower court state-
ment that entry by a firefighter into a home "broke the secrecy of the place," thus
opening the premises for warrantless entry by police. United States v. Hoffman, 607
F.2d 280, 284 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979). The policeman first needed to get a warrant even
though his intrusion into the home was no greater than the firefighters who preceded
him.
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hibited from doing simply because they are invited in by an official.
If property owners, even when absent, retain possessory and pri-
vacy interests in their homes despite calamities and the presence of
officials, one cannot assume society would recognize a custom creat-
ing a privilege for journalists to enter with officials. On the contrary,
it is more reasonable to think that householders would oppose access
by journalists. It is unreasonable to assume that householders would
willingly acquiesce to the presence of cameras and microphones in
their living rooms or that they would choose to be displayed on tele-
vision in their nightgowns while undergoing emergency resuscitation
or arrest. The intrusion into Ms. Fletcher's fire-damaged home is
perhaps less severe than in cases of raids when the owner is present;
however, there is no reason to think the community would approve
public entrance to a bedroom and later publication of a picture of the
spot where a young woman lay dead.152
IV. BEYOND PRIVILEGE
Even if journalists' entry with officials is so common as to be privi-
leged under the doctrine of custom and usage, the privilege is condi-
tional. A privilege, like consent, is limited to the purpose for which it
is granted. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that nonconsen-
sual privileges are conditioned on their exercise for a proper pur-
pose.153 A trespasser's privilege terminates when the entry is no
longer "normal and proper"154 or when a privileged entry becomes
"an unwarranted or offensive intrusion."155 If trespassers are inten-
152. One commentator suggests that it is easier to assume that a property owner
would consent to a peaceful entry resulting in a broadcast about a natural disaster,
such as the fire in the Fletcher case, than to a nighttime raid resulting in reports of a
person's arrest, as in Green Valley School, Inc. v. Cowles Fla. Broadcasting, Inc., 327
So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See Note, The Doctrine of Custom and Usage as a
Defense for Trespassing Newsmen: Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 30 FED. COMM.
L.J. 77, 82 (1977). Reporting the natural disaster, the commentator says "would proba-
bly not damage the landowner's reputation and would not invariably cause him emo-
tional distress." Id. However, it is difficult to see how learning about the death of
one's daughter from a newspaper photo, as Ms. Fletcher did, would be any less emo-
tionally disturbing than reading about or enduring a raid on one's home. Even if
peaceful entry after a calamity is less intrusive than a raid, it remains sufficiently in-
trusive to vitiate implied consent. The growing number of suits against reporters who
accompany police on entries to private property suggests householders do find this
practice intrusive.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 comment c (1979).
154. Boston Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornalski, 234 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
155. DeBerry v. City of La Grange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 83, 8 S.E.2d 146, 156 (1940). The
tionally intrusive, they may become liable for tortious intrusion or
malicious trespass.1 56 To determine whether an entry is a tortious in-
trusion, a court will "consider the degree of intrusion, the context,
conduct, and circumstances surrounding the intrusion, as well as the
intruder's motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes,
and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded."57
A. Intrusion
If custom and usage create a privilege for journalists to trespass,
the easiest case in which to recognize the privilege would involve
trespass on the property beyond the curtilage. Trespass by news-
gathering journalists on the outer boundaries of property may serve
first amendment goals while intruding only minimally on the prop-
erty and privacy interests of a householder.158
As journalists move inside the home it is difficult to discern a cus-
tom reasonably permitting trespass. Ironically, journalists have said
they consider even daytime police raids on a workplace to be offen-
sively intrusive, particularly if a camera records the proceedings. A
journalist for the Ventura, California, Star-Free Press, felt "violated"
when police she was accompanying raided her newspaper office look-
ing for drugs. "[This] was my house, this is where I work," the jour-
nalist said.159 Especially disturbing to some reporters and editors
during the raid was the presence of a newspaper-hired security guard
who stood near the entrance to the newspaper and videotaped the
proceedings. "Several reporters made a point of getting out of her
Georgia court noted that "an entry by a trespasser, as opposed to a licensee, implies an
unwarranted or offensive intrusion on the premises." Id.
156. The intruder may be liable for invasion of privacy if he "intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns" in a manner that would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
157. Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1483-84, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (1986).
158. See, e.g., McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343 (Or. 1975) (surveillance
on edge of property is trespassory but not malicious harassment or an invasion of pri-
vacy).
Curtilage is difficult to define, but at common law it is the area to which extends the
intimate activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Curtilage includes the "yard,
courtyard or other pieces of ground included within the fence surrounding a dwelling
house." Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1964). Curtilage also in-
cludes the following: (1) the backyard not normally used as a common passageway in a
four unit apartment building, Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974); (2) a
tobacco barn within a fenced farm, Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1980); (3) rear
unenclosed yard of a residence, State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1981); and (4) a
hothouse made of clear plastic behind a house, Huffer v. State, 344 So. 2d 1332 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
159. Greene, An Insider's Look at the Newspaper Drug Bust, EDITOR & PUBLISHER,
Aug. 8, 1987, at 37.
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field of vision."1 60
While the daytime entry of journalists with officials at workplaces
might not be tortiously intrusive, entries beyond the threshold of the
home, particularly nighttime entries into bedrooms, are much more
offensive. Thus, the California Court of Appeal ruled in Miller v.
NBC161 that the plaintiff had a cause of action for trespass, intrusion,
and infliction of emotional distress. The court remarked that reason-
able people might regard an NBC camera crew's entry into a bed-
room with paramedics "at a time of vulnerability and confusion" to
be "highly offensive" conduct.162
Particularly offensive to the court in Miller was the failure of the
producer of a television documentary to seek permission to enter pri-
vate homes.163 Instead, the producer worked out an agreement with
officials to enter several homes for documentary filming.16 4 Reason-
able people, the court said, "could construe the lack of restraint and
sensitivity NBC producer Norte and his crew displayed as a cavalier
disregard for ordinary citizens' rights of privacy." 65 The court fur-
ther stated that "crossing the threshold of a private residence with-
out, apparently, even a moment's hesitation," was also evidence of
the "reckless disregard of the rights and sensitivities of others"
which supported Ms. Miller's emotional distress claim.' 66 Reckless
disregard of the rights and sensitivities of others could also be evi-
dence of malicious trespass.167
Similarly, a Dane County, Wisconsin, jury awarded a Beloit couple
$25,000 for trespass by journalists and police and for a civil rights vio-
lation by officials when the Rock County Sheriff's Department al-
lowed a Madison television reporter to accompany deputies on a 5:00
a.m. raid.168 The jury also awarded $5,000 punitive damages against
160. Id. at 11.
161. 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1986).




166. Id. at 1487-88, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
167. Malice requires a showing that the wrong is aggravated by an evil or wrongful
motive or that there was willful and intentional misdoing, or a reckless indifference
equivalent thereto. Le Mistral v. CBS, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1913, 1914 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978).
168. Kyle McKinnon, a reporter for WISC in Madison accompanied Rock County
Sheriff's Department deputies on a 5:00 a.m. raid at the home of Robert and Sandra
Stevens on September 25, 1984. The Stevens' were not mentioned by name in the au-
dio report. Rogers & Callender, supra note 9. A jury later awarded the Stevens
$25,000 damages, but did not separate the award into amounts for the joint trespass by
the journalist for malicious trespass. 169
A warning to all journalists accompanying officials into private
homes is found in Huskey v. NBC.170 The district court held that a
prisoner had a cause of action for intrusion and public disclosure of
private facts for film taken of him while he was exercising.' 7 ' The
court reasoned that a prisoner in an "exercise cage" accessible only to
prison guards is in a "secluded" place where he has an expectation
not to be seen or filmed without his consent.172 The court concluded
that prisoners may expect prison officials to intrude upon their pri-
vacy, but prisoners retain an expectation to be free from private in-
trusions.173 If a convicted prisoner may have an expectation against
unwanted filming in an exercise cage, a presumably innocent house-
holder should have at least an equal expectation in his or her
bedroom.
Also beyond a privilege created by custom would be journalists'
participation in a search that violates a householder's fourth amend-
ment rights. While trespass by an official may not invade privacy
sufficiently to violate the fourth amendment,174 official conduct that
does violate the fourth amendment is sufficiently intrusive to be tor-
tious if carried out by private citizens. If an official's warrantless
search and seizure within a home is presumptively unreasonable, 175 a
privilege based on custom would not be reasonable if it permits the
same conduct by a private citizen. Filming and broadcasting a rea-
officials and journalists and for the officials' civil rights violation. Telephone interview
with Jeff Scott Olson, attorney for the Stevens (May 20, 1988).
169. The jury found the journalists' trespass to be malicious because the reporters
violated their employers' manuals requiring them to seek permission to enter private
property. Plaintiffs lost the privacy count because the jury ruled the intrusion was not
"highly offensive" as required by Wisconsin statute. The jury believed there was a
public interest to be served in showing how police operate. Rogers & Callender, supra
note 9. See also The Capital Times (Madison, Wis.), Nov. 28, 1986, at 23, col. 1. A Wis-
consin jury awarded nominal damages of $1 to a Ripon, Wisconsin, mother and her
four children for trespass and violation of privacy when police invited a weekly news-
paper reporter to cover a raid on their home. Id
The Miller case in California and the jury awards in two Wisconsin cases have, ac-
cording to one commentator, "significantly expanded the nature and scope of liability
media organizations face in gathering news about the operations of public safety agen-
cies." NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, supra note 34, at 21.
170. 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
171. Id. at 1287-89.
172. Id. at 1288. "Prisons are largely closed systems, within which prisoners may
become understandably inured to the gaze of staff and other prisoners, while at the
same time feeling justifiably secluded from the outside world (at least in certain areas
not normally visited by outsiders)." Id.
173. Id, at 1291-92.
174. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver, the Court stated:
"The law of trespass ... forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth Amendment
would not proscribe. For trespass law extends to instances where the exercise of the
right to exclude vindicates no legitimate privacy interest." Id at 183.
175. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
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sonable search and seizure may not make an official entry unreasona-
ble,176 but participation by journalists and camera crews in an
unconstitutional search should not be privileged.
Journalists would surely be liable for intrusion or malicious tres-
pass if they participated with officials in severe abuses of a citizen's
right of privacy, such as taking unnecessary photographs of a nude
person,177 or participating in body searches of the opposite sex.1 78
Less extreme and more likely is journalist participation in unconsti-
tutionally "rude invasions of privacy."'179 In Green Valley School v.
Cowles Florida Publishing Co.,180 a Florida District Court of Appeal
denied summary judgment for journalists in a malicious trespass case
where the journalists accompanied officials on a midnight raid of the
school. Groggy teachers and students were interviewed on camera in
front of bright television lights after being rousted from their beds by
police.
Although fourth amendment issues were not raised, officials in
Green Valley were accused of using abusive force and operating
under a faulty warrant. The court stated that officials conducted an
"inexcusable and probably illegal" search.181 According to testimony
in the case, broadcast journalists took footage of rooms only after po-
lice jumbled the contents.18 2 The Florida District Court of Appeal
rejected a custom and usage defense. The court declared that recog-
nizing a custom to enter bedrooms during a police investigation
"could well bring to the citizenry of this state the hobnail boots of a
nazi stormtrooper equipped with glaring lights invading a couple's
bedroom at midnight with the wife hovering in her nightgown in an
attempt to shield herself from the scanning TV camera."' 8 3
Even the search in Fletcher, though calm and orderly, probably vio-
lated the fourth amendment. Although the officials' entry in
Fletcher was not boisterous or rude, they apparently conducted a
warrantless search for arson which, in 1988, would be unconstitu-
tional. Once the emergency is over, as in Fletcher, officials may
search without a warrant for the cause and origin of a fire. However,
the fourth amendment does not permit officials to conduct a warrant-
176. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 295 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Ct. App. 1980).
177. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
178. Doe v. Duter, 407 F. Supp. 922 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
179. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
180. 327 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
181. Id. at 817.
182. Id. at 815.
183. 1& at 819.
less search for arson.184 Furthermore, custom does not create a privi-
lege for journalists to participate in a criminal search, particularly in
a bedroom, when the inviting officials are violating the fourth
amendment.
Even if officials did not violate Ms. Fletcher's fourth amendment
right of privacy, it was 'unnecessary for them to invite journalists into
the home to take pictures and search for evidence of arson. Officials
could have found experts with greater skills than journalists to pro-
vide leads in an arson investigation.
B. Civil Rights Liability
Lurking in the cases of journalists accompanying officials is possi-
ble civil rights liability.18 5 Trespassing journalists and officials would
normally be liable only for the most egregious intrusions into pri-
vacy.18 6 One federal court has ruled a prisoner can pursue a civil
184. Once on the property, officials making an arrest are permitted under the
fourth amendment to conduct warrantless searches of the immediate vicinity to insure
their own safety and to be certain that evidence will not be destroyed. The most com-
mon warrantless search is incident to arrest. See W. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 5.2(c), at 275 (1978). While insuring his safety and preventing destruction of evi-
dence, an officer is supposed to limit the search to the arrestee's person and area of
immediate control. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
Police and fire officials may legally seize criminal evidence in plain view while se-
curing an arrest area or searching for the cause and origin of a fire, but they may not
use that evidence as a pretext for a warrantless search of the premises. The scope of
an administrative search once a fire is under control "is limited to that reasonably nec-
essary to determine the cause and origin of a fire and to ensure against rekindling."
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 (1984). Fire officials may also conduct such
"routine procedures" as "searching for and rescuing occupants, ventilating the build-
ing, searching for any additional fires, and securing the premises." United States v.
Johnson, 524 F. Supp. 199, 204 (D. Del. 1981). The Eleventh Circuit holds that fire offi-
cials must procure a warrant after a fire even to seek out valuable possessions in a
home to secure them from looters. United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 816 (11th Cir.
1983), reh'g denied, 734 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1984).
185. A plaintiff may claim a civil rights violation under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act if he can show that the defendant, acting under color of law, deprived him
of a right secured by the constitution or the law of the United States. Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
186. See, e.g., York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963); Doe v. Duter, 407 F. Supp.
922 (W.D. Wis. 1976). A police officer has immunity from liability under section 1983 if
he operates in good faith. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). An official
loses his qualified immunity if he "knew or reasonably should have known" that his
action would violate a citizen's constitutional rights or if he acts "with malicious inten-
tion to cause a deprivation" of a constitutional right. Id. at 815 (emphasis in original).
It is not a civil rights violation for an official to make public the fact of an arrest,
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1970); or to photograph or disseminate information about
an arrest or other official activity in a public place, Huskey v. Dallas Chronicle, 13 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 1057 (D. Or. 1986). The Huskey court found that it was not a civil
rights violation to photograph a suspect being booked at the police station. Id. at 1058.
The court held that the photographs did not constitute an unreasonable seizure even
though jail policy prohibited photography, because the suspect was photographed in a
"public premise." Id.
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rights suit against a warden who permits a camera crew to film a
prisoner without the prisoner's consent. 18 7 The court refused sum-
mary judgment because there remained a question whether the pris-
oner's privacy was invaded by filming him without his consent where
the filming served no legitimate security interest of the prison.
Could an official face similar liability for permitting journalists to
film a presumably innocent person in a bedroom?
Even if a journalist participates in an entry that might violate a
civil right, the journalist will not be held liable unless he acts under
color of law. Whether a private individual acts as an agent or instru-
ment of the state depends on all of the circumstances of a case.' 88
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code "does not reach
purely private conduct."189 One is not a government agent simply be-
cause he operates under a government tariffl 90 or voluntarily acts out
of a desire to help officials.191
Thus, journalists working for a newspaper or broadcaster are not
arms of the law simply because they enter private property with an
official. Journalists who take the initiative to enter private property
with officials and who do not act under the supervision of authorities
operate for themselves and their employer, -not under color of law.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that a broadcast journalist
acted "exclusively for his private employer" by going to the scene on
his own initiative, asking officials for admittance, and playing no offi-
cial role in the raid.192
187. Smith v. Fairman, 98 F.R.D. 445 (C.D. Ill. 1982); see also Huskey v. NBC, Inc.,
632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986). But see Jenkins v. Winchester Star, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1403 (W.D. Va. 1981) (no cause of action under section 1983 for newspaper's
publication of a picture taken without consent of sleeping prisoner). Accord Mimms v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
188. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971).
189. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973).
190. Under United States tariff regulations, an airline employee who conducts an
inspection of a suspicious package engages in a private search as opposed to a search
conducted by a government agent. United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1312 (10th Cir.
1975). The court specifically noted that a person agrees as a condition to sending a
package with a private airline that the package, may be opened by the carrier. Id. at
1311.
191. United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Marshall
v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1965) (landlady held not a government
agent, but merely acting "as any responsible citizen should" when she volunteers to
give police a suitcase containing contraband entrusted to her care by tenant). The wife
of a criminal suspect is not an agent of officials if she voluntarily provides evidence in
response to noncoercive questions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489
(1971).
192. Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 137, 295 N.W.2d 768, 774 (Ct. App. 1980).
A private citizen's actions are under color of law when he acts in
"collusion" with,193 or at the "behest" of the government. 9 4 Fur-
thermore, a private citizen may be held to have acted under color of
law if he willfully participates in joint activity with the state or its
agents.195 A private citizen has been found to act as an agent of po-
lice when conducting a search under the direction of police.196 Jour-
nalists are said to be acting "in concert" with police when they
secretly transmit conversations to police tape recorders.197
Ironically, journalists suggest they operate under color of law when
they seek a privilege to trespass with officials under the doctrine of
custom and usage. Citizens may act under color of law when they act
Brosamle learned of the raid from monitoring a police radio. There was a question,
however, whether the officer consented to Brosamle's entry or merely indicated no ob-
jection to Brosamle's presence when he allowed the journalist to come forward after
the situation was under control. Id, at 154, 295 N.W.2d at 782.
193. United States v. Harding, 475 F.2d 480, 483 (10th Cir. 1973).
194. United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1324 (10th Cir. 1979).
195. Prahl, 98 Wis. 2d at 137, 295 N.W.2d at 774 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)). Some courts have examined whether a private citizen partici-
pating in a search does so solely for governmental purposes. Eg., Corngold v. United
States, 367 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1966).
A person acts under color of state law when exercising power "possessed by virtue of
state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law." United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, reh'g denied, 314 U.S. 707
(1941). See generally R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.17, at 770 (1986).
196. People v. Turner, 249 Cal. App. 2d 909, 926, 57 Cal. Rptr. 854, 865 (1967). In
Turner, the court found no civil rights violation when employees of a private company
helped officers search for evidence of crime in accounting records. Id. at 926-27, 57 Cal.
Rptr. at 865. The court noted, however, that the company agents, who were operating
under officers' supervision, were acting as the arms of the arresting officers. Id. at 927,
57 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
197. A federal district court in California ruled that journalists acting as informants
for police, secretly transmitting conversations to police tape recorders, were subject to
fourth amendment restrictions because they were agents acting "in concert" with po-
lice. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925, 931 (C.D. Cal. 1968). The district court
stated, "the officers as well as their agents were subject to the restrictions of the
Fourth Amendment, particularly where they were acting in concert. Certainly the ac-
tivities of the officers and their agents (Life's employees) constituted a search." Id.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether journalists' surreptitious trans-
mission to police violated the fourth amendment because Time, Inc., the journalists'
employer, denied its employees were acting on behalf of the police. Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). However, Judge Carter thought the appeals
court should decide the fourth amendment question and believed "that the agreement
constituted Life and its employees agents of the police." Id. at 250 (Carter, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
A private detective may act under color of law if he has a special city police officer's
card, even though he acts under the authority of, and is paid by, a private employer.
William v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); see Note, The Use of Trespass Laws to En-
force Private Policies of Discrimination, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 451 (1965). Plant
guards under owner's pay and control act under color of law when sworn in as civilian
auxiliaries to military police. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416
(1947).
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as part of official policy and custom. 198 Customs established in law
include the "persistent and widespread .. . practices of .. . offi-
cials."199 One commentator writes that a form of "deputization" oc-
curs when a private person agrees to an official request to assist in a
search and arrest.20 0 In a suit that was dismissed for failure to estab-
lish violation of a constitutional right, a plaintiff argued that journal-
ists were imbued with state action because officials had a custom of
allowing the press to participate in criminal investigations. 201
Many journalists accompanying officials into private homes are
clearly not acting under color of law. If the journalists ask to enter
private property and do not participate in official activities, they do
not act under color of law. However, journalists may be held to act
under color of law when they, like the photojournalists in Fletcher,
customarily enter private property at the request of police and
firefighters to participate in official duties. To other courts, the dis-
tinguishing features of Fletcher are the invitation from officials and
the photojournalist's participation in an official search.202 Journalists
might also be said to act under color of law when it is established
that officials invite the media only if they expect favorable public-
ity.203 Plaintiffs in Wisconsin charged that officials invited journal-
ists on a no-knock search of a family's home in order to harass the
family and promote better public relations for the police
department. 204
198. A municipality might be liable under section 1983 if action were the result of a
municipal "policy statement, ordinance, regulation ... decision ... or governmental
'custom.'" Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978); see
Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of 'Policy and Custom',
79 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1979).
199. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-
68 (1970)).
200. J. KAKALIK & S. WILDHORN, IV THE LAW AND PRIVATE POLICE 4 (Law En-
forcement Assistance Admin. 1971).
201. Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980). Not
deciding the state action question, the court determined that allowing journalists to ac-
company officials on a search warrant was not a gross abuse of the constitutional right
of privacy. Id. at 2372-73.
202. See An Attorney v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 481 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1985);
Prahl v. Brosmale, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 149, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Ct. App. 1980). In Missis-
sippi State Bar, an attorney's trespassory entry with an inspector into a burned-out
building was contrasted with the nontrespassory entry by a photographer in Fletcher.
The cases are distinguishable because the photographer in Fletcher entered by "invita-
tion of the fire marshal and was part of the official investigation of the fire." 481 So.
2d at 300.
203. NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL, COVERING CRIME: How MUCH PRESS-POLICE COOP-
ERATION? How LITTLE? 17 (1981).
204. Umhoefer, Ripon Police, Newspaper Lose Lawsuit Over Search of Home, Mil-
V. ETHICAL CONCERNS
Even if journalists accompanying officials do not act under color of
law and are not subject to legal liability, there are ethical concerns
which suggest journalists do not want to work too closely with offi-
cials. Eugene Patterson, former President and Editor of the St. Pe-
tersburg Times, once warned that "the public had better start
worrying" when the press and police become partners. 20 5
Generally, journalists shun identification as helpmates or agents of
police, fire, or other officials. While journalists cooperate and share
information with officials, they frequently eschew extensive collabo-
ration out of fear that the public will no longer find journalists credi-
ble as independent surrogates for the reader or viewer.206 It is
difficult for journalists to maintain the role of independent reporter
or government adversary207 when they routinely rely on official cu's-
tom to enter private homes.
Relying on official invitations to gather news may also undermine
journalists' independence by obliging them to provide pictures, tapes,
and other information to officials either as a quid pro quo for an invi-
tation or in response to a subpoena. Cooperating with police to gather
information may also jeopardize journalists' privilege to withhold
sources subpoenaed by officials.208
VI. CONCLUSION
Officials who invite journalists into private homes and apartments
place journalists in a paradoxical position. On the one hand, journal-
ists are invited on a newsworthy expedition, the reporting of which
serves first amendment purposes. On the other hand, journalists
who accompany officials risk liability for trespass and violations of
privacy. The journalist's potential liability may be highest where the
newsworthiness of the event is greatest.
Despite the newsworthiness of journalists' coverage of official ac-
tivities in private homes, journalists should have no privilege to enter
private homes with officials. Courts are correct not to extend the
custom and usage privilege of Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher to
other situations where the press accompanies officials into private
waukee J., Nov. 26, 1986, at 6B, col. 5. Another Wisconsin sheriff who invited journal-
ists on a drug raid and a pre-raid briefing with 50 officers was running for reelection.
Olson, Does the Wisconsin Privacy Act Work? An Interview With the Jury Foreman
in Stevens v. Television Wisconsin, Inc. 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
205. See supra note 203, at 16.
206. Id. at 12, 23.
207. See Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (1985).
208. See supra note 203, at 11-12.
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homes. There is little evidence that the practice is indeed customary
in the sanctity of the private dwelling. Even if journalists do have a
privilege to trespass on private property, it should not extend to rude
and intrusive entries into bedrooms where a householder's privacy
interests are the greatest. Journalists entering private places, partic-
ularly bedrooms, may be liable not only for trespass, but also for in-
trusion, malicious trespass, and perhaps eventually civil rights
violations. In relying on the invitation of officials to gain entry to
private homes, journalists compromise their reputation for ethical
and independent newsgathering.

